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It is understood that rational expectations equilibria may not be incen-
tive compatible: agents with private information may be able to aﬀect prices
through the information conveyed by their market behavior. We present a
simple general equilibrium model to illustrate the connection between the
notion of informational size presented in McLean and Postlewaite (2002)
and the incentive properties of market equilibria. Speciﬁcally, we show
that fully revealing market equilibria are not incentive compatible for an
economy with few privately informed producers because of the producers’
informational size, but that replicating the economy decreases agents’ in-
formational size. For suﬃciently large economies, there exists an incentive
compatible fully revealing market equilibrium.
1. Introduction
In many markets of interest, agents are asymmetrically informed. Sellers of stock
or automobiles often possess information that potential buyers do not have. In
∗To appear in General Equilibrium, Sunspots and Incomplete Markets, edited by Stephen
Spear, Springer, forthcoming.
†Postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation. We
want to thank David Easley for helpful conversations.the presence of informational asymmetries, prices may reveal information to some
agents. A particularly low price for shares in a company may signal to an un-
informed agent that better informed agents are not buying the stock, or may be
selling the stock. The notion of rational expectations equilibrium is one generally
accepted extension of Walrasian equilibrium to economies with asymmetrically
informed agents. As in the case of symmetric information, agents are assumed to
maximize expected utility in a rational expectations equilibrium. In the rational
expectations model, however, agents maximize expected utility not with respect
to an exogenously given probability distribution. Instead, agents maximize ex-
pected utility with respect to an updated probability distribution that combines
their initial information with the additional information conveyed by the prices.
Informational asymmetries can have serious consequences for the performance
of an economy. While Walrasian equilibria are Pareto eﬃcient under quite gen-
eral conditions when agents are symmetrically informed, market outcomes in the
simplest of economies can be ineﬃcient when the agents are asymmetrically in-
formed, as shown clearly in Akerlof’s Lemon’s paper (Akerlof (1970)). In at least
one case, however, asymmetric information does not result in ineﬃciency. This is
the case in which the rational expectations equilibrium is fully revealing, that is,
when the price reﬂects all of the agents’ information. If the price conveys all the
information that agents have, then each agent’s decision problem is equivalent to
the problem that would be solved if all the information were publicly available.
In this case, the welfare theorems assure that eﬃcient outcomes are obtained.
Fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are ex-post eﬃcient, but open
the question of the reasonableness of the price-taking assumption. As in the case
of Walrasian analysis of symmetric information economies, rational expectations
equilibria assume that agents ignore the eﬀect of their market behavior on prices.
In economies with symmetrically informed agents, this assumption is sometimes
justiﬁed by a heuristic argument that in large economies agents will not be able
to aﬀect the price. There is also a formal foundation for this argument that relies
on the explicit modeling of agents’ strategic possibilities in a general equilibrium
setting and provides conditions under which the Nash equilibria of the strategic
market game are approximately Walrasian.1 Roughly, it can be shown that, in
plausible strategic market games, agents will have little eﬀect on the price of a good
when they control a small portion of the good. This provides some justiﬁcation
that price-taking behavior is a plausible assumption for agents in large economies.
The situation with asymmetric information is more complicated since agents
1See, e.g., Mas Colell, Dubey and Shubik (1980) or Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978, 1981).
2can aﬀect the price not only through the quantity of a good that they trade, but
also through the information their trades reveal. This second channel through
which agents can aﬀect prices means that it is not enough that the quantity of
a good that an agent controls is small relative to the aggregate quantity of that
good. An agent with a small amount of a particular good may aﬀect the price
of that good because of the information he possesses. It is well understood that
there may be a conﬂict between the information contained in rational expectations
equilibrium prices and an agent’s incentive to reveal, directly or indirectly, his
information.2
This conﬂict should not in itself be surprising, since the incentive not to take
prices as given exists even when agents are symmetrically informed. The most
that one would hope for is that the eﬀect of an agent’s behavior on prices, via the
information that his market behavior reveals, will be negligible in large economies.
Palfrey and Srivastava (1986) considered a stochastic replication procedure for an
economy in which the incentive compatibility problems associated with rational
expectations equilibria asymptotically vanish. However, their stochastic replica-
tion procedure has the property that, with probability one, each agent’s private
information is duplicated as the number of agents increases. In a large economy,
a single agent’s information is redundant in the presence of the information of all
other agents.
We are interested in situations in which a single agent’s information is not
redundant. The prototypical large economy that we envision is one in which pref-
erences and technology depend on the state of the world, which is not directly
known. Each agent has some information (a signal) regarding the relative like-
lihoods of states. When agents’ signals are conditionally independent (given the
true state), the signal of a single agent can still provide additional information
about the true state, even in the presence of many agents. However, the incre-
mental value of that signal vanishes as the number of agents becomes large. In
this world, agents become “informationally small” as economies grows, but they
never become “informationally irrelevant.” There is a large literature analyzing
competitive models that ignores the asymmetric information that must surely be
present in any real-world problem. The usefulness of analyses that ignore such
asymmetric information hinges on the belief that the incentive problems brought
on by asymmetrically informed agents become negligible in large economies.
We present and analyze a simple general equilibrium example with asymmet-
rically informed agents similar to that described above. In the example, asym-
2See, e.g., Blume and Easley (1983).
3metrically informed agents make production decisions based on their private in-
f o r m a t i o n .M a r k e t st h e no p e ni nw h i c ht h ep r o d u c e dg o o d sa r et r a d e d .W h e nt h e
number of producers is small, the fully revealing market equilibria are not incen-
tive compatible; an agent’s market behavior can reveal private information, and
the revealed information can aﬀect prices in ways detrimental to that agent. Con-
sequently, when agents take into account the informational impact of their market
behavior, the outcome may be diﬀerent from the competitive outcome. However,
when the economy is replicated in a natural way, agents become information-
ally small, where the notion of informational size is essentially that introduced in
McLean and Postlewaite (2002). As a consequence of their asymptotically vanish-
ing informational size, agents will have no incentive to manipulate prices in large
economies.
We discuss within the example several of the issues that arise in modelling
general equilibrium economies with asymmetric information, including the com-
pleteness of markets and multiple equilibria.
2. Example
The economy. There are two states of nature that are equally likely, θ1 and
θ2 and two periods. There are two kinds of agents, producers and consumers, and
three commodities: type 1 widgets, type 2 widgets, and money (denoted m).
Producers. There are n producers, each of whom can make exactly one
widget using his own labor and chooses which type to produce in the ﬁrst period.
The producers’ choice of widgets is simultaneous. Producers have identical state
independent payoﬀ functions deﬁned simply as their ﬁnal holdings of money. That
is, they value neither widgets nor their own labor input.
Consumers. Each consumer is endowed with 20 units of money but no
widgets. Consumers have the same utility function u(·) that depends on the
state, the number x1 of type 1 widgets consumed, the number x2 of type 2 widgets
consumed and the ﬁnal holding of money as given in the table below:
u(x1,x 2,m,θ1)=m +2 5 x1
u(x1,x 2,m,θ2)=m +1 0 x2
Note that, in state θi,only type i widgets yield positive utility.
Information. Prior to production, each producer receives a noisy signal of
the state. The conditional distributions of the signal a producer receives in each





Producers’ signals are conditionally independent.
Markets. There are no markets open in the ﬁrst period. In the second
period competitive markets open in which the widgets that have been produced
can be exchanged for money. Since producers incur no opportunity cost in making
widgets, each of the ¯ n producers makes a widget. We denote by n the number
of widgets of type 1 produced in period 1 (hence, there are ¯ n − n type 2 widgets
produced). If producers choose to make diﬀerent types of widgets when they have
observed s1 than they make when they have observed s2, the mix of widgets on
t h em a r k e ti np e r i o d2 will convey information about the state θ.I f c o n s u m e r s
rationally take this information into account, the competitive price in period 2
will depend on the mix of widgets oﬀered for exchange.
A strategy for a producer is a mapping σ : {s1,s 2} → {1,2} specifying which
type of widget to produce as a function of the observed signal. We consider
symmetric equilibria in which all producers employ the same (pure) strategy. If
σ(s1)=σ(s2), then no information will be conveyed by the mix of widgets on the
market. However, if σ(s1) 6= σ(s2), the number of widgets of type 1 will reveal
the number of producers who received each of the two signals.
Consumers form expectations given the (common) strategy of the producers
and the number of widgets of each type that are oﬀered on the market in the
second period. When σ(s1) 6= σ(s2), Bayes rule uniquely determines the posterior
distribution on Θ,b u ti fσ(s1)=σ(s2) there are producer choices lying oﬀ the equi-
librium path where one or more producers produce the widget which was not the
strategic choice for either of the signals. We denote by µ(·|n)=( µ(θ1|n),µ(θ2|n)),
a consumer’s beliefs when he observes n widgets of type 1 on the market. We as-
sume that µ(θ1|n) is the Bayesian posterior probability on θ1 when the number
of widgets of type 1,n ,is consistent with producers’ (common) strategy σ,a n d
unrestricted otherwise.3 No restriction is placed on consumers’ beliefs when n is
not consistent with σ.
Let J¯ n = {1,.., ¯ n}. Ap r i c ei saf u n c t i o nJn → R2
+ where p(n)=( pn
1,p n
2) is
the pair of prices for widgets 1 and 2 respectively when n widgets of type 1 are
3It will be consistent with σ if either (i) σ(s1) 6= σ(s2); or (ii) σ(s1)=σ(s2)=1and n =¯ n;
or (iii) σ(s1)=σ(s2)=2and n =0 .
5produced in period 1.( T h ep r i c eo fm is normalized to 1.) Given a price function
p(·) , consumers maximize expected utility (with respect to their beliefs µ(·|n)).
A market equilibrium is a price p(·) and optimizing behavioral rules for producers
and consumers for which markets clear.4
Deﬁnition: Given beliefs, n 7→ µ(·|n),amarket equilibrium (ME) is a price
function p(·) and a common producer strategy σ(·),f o rw h i c h
i. The symmetric strategy proﬁle (σ(·),...,σ(·)) is a Bayes equilibrium and
ii. For each n, consumer demand for widgets at price p(n) is equal to number
the of widgets produced.
When consumers’ have large initial endowments of money, they will want to
purchase a large number of widgets of a given type if the expected utility of that
type of widget is greater than the price. Similarly, they will purchase none if
the expected utility is below the price. Consequently, the only possible market
clearing prices for suﬃciently large m a r et h o s ef o rw h i c ht h em a r k e tp r i c eo f
each widget is equal to the expected value of that widget. The expected value of
widget 1 when there are n widget 1’s on the market is (given producer strategy σ)
25µ(θ1|n), which then must be the price of widget 1 when n widget 1’s are oﬀered
on the market. Analogously, the expected value and the price of widget 2 when
n widget 1’s are oﬀered is 10µ(θ2|n).
We are interested in the existence (or nonexistence) of a fully revealing market
equilibrium (FRME), that is a market equilibrium for which the equilibrium price
reveals the private information that agents (producers) have. When σ(s1) 6=
σ2(s2),t h ep r i c er e ﬂects the number of widgets of type 1 on the market, which is
the same as the number of producers who have observed signal s1.H e n c e ,aM E
is fully revealing if the common producer strategy is separating. We will show
that fully revealing ME cannot exist when the number of producers is too small,
but they will exist if the number of producers is suﬃciently large.
T h ec a s eo fas i n g l ep r o d u c e r
In the presence of a single producer, the problem reduces to the existence
of a separating equilibrium in a simple sender-receiver game. In a separating
4We use the term market equilibrium rather than rational expectations equilibrium because
producers’ choices may not maximize expected proﬁt at the given prices since their decisions
must be taken prior to time at which the market opens. We discuss this further in the last
section.
6equilibrium, the producer chooses one type of widget when he observes signal s1
and the other type when he observes signal s2.
Suppose that σ(s1)=1and σ(s2)=2 .N o t e ﬁrst that, given this strategy,
the consumers’ beliefs are µ(θ1|1) = .8 if he sees widget 1 and µ(θ1|0) = .2 if he
sees widget 2. The equilibrium prices must therefore be p1
1 =2 5 µ(θ1|1) = 20,
p1
2 =1 0 µ(θ2|1) = 2 and p0
1 =2 5 µ(θ1|0) = 5, p0
2 =1 0 µ(θ2|0) = 8. We claim that
this proposed strategy is not an equilibrium. To see this, suppose the producer
receives signal s2. If the producer produces widget 2,h i sp a y o ﬀ will be p0
2 =8 ,
while his payoﬀ from deviating and producing widget 1 is p1
1 =2 0 . Thus, there
cannot be a separating equilibrium in which the producer chooses widget 2 when
he receives signal s2.
The same type of argument demonstrates that there cannot be a separating
equilibrium in which the producer chooses widget 2 when he receives signal 1.
Thus there cannot be a fully revealing equilibrium when there is a single producer.
We note that welfare is maximized when the producer chooses widget 1 after
receiving signal 1 and widget 2 after signal 2.
T h ec a s eo ft w op r o d u c e r s
Suppose there are two producers. We will show that as in the case of a single
producer, there can be no separating equilibrium. Let σ(·) be the common strategy
and suppose that σ(s1) 6= σ(s2). In particular, suppose that σ(s1)=1and
σ(s2)=2 . Finally, suppose that producer 1 receives signal s2. If both producers
are following this strategy the consumers’ beliefs about state 1 following 0, 1 or 2
widget 1’s being oﬀered on the market are given in the table below.
Widget Production Consumers’ beliefs Expected value Expected value
of widget 1 of widget 2
2w i d g e t10s µ(θ1|2) = .94 23.5 .5
1w i d g e t1 µ(θ1|1) = .5 12.5 5
0w i d g e t10s µ(θ1|0) = .06 1.5 9.4
As before, the market clearing price of widgets must be the expected value of
the widget. If a producer chooses to produce a type 2 widget, then the most that
he will get for this widget is 9.4. If he produces a type 1 widget, then his payoﬀ is
at least 12.5. Consequently it cannot be an equilibrium for producers to produce
widget 1 following signal 1 and widget 2 following signal 2.
7As in the case of a single producer, the calculations for the strategy which
prescribes producing widget 1 following signal 2 and widget 2 following signal 1
are the same as in case 1. Consequently, this producer strategy will not be an
equilibrium either.
In summary, when there are 2 producers there is no symmetric separating
equilibrium. It is easy to see why: a consumer values widget 1 more highly in
state θ1 than he values widget 2 in θ2.P r o d u c e r 1 aﬀects consumers’ beliefs
through his choice of widget. If consumers expect producers to choose widget 2
after seeing widget 2, a producer’s payoﬀ will be higher if he instead produces
widget 1.
T h ec a s eo fm a n yp r o d u c e r s
When there are many producers, there will exist separating equilibria in which
each producer chooses widget i after receiving signal si, i =1 ,2.5 Suppose produc-
ers receive conditionally independent, noisy signals of the state that are accurate
with probability .8 (that is, P(si|θi)=.8). If n is large and if all producers
follow the separating strategy proposed above, then, with high probability, ap-
proximately 80% of the widgets oﬀered for sale will be of type 1 when the state
is θ1 (so that n ≈ .8n) and approximately 80% of the widgets oﬀered for sale will
be of type 2 when the state is θ2 (so that n ≈ .2n ). This observation is simply
an application of the law of large numbers. If n is large and if approximately
80% of the widgets are of type 1 (i.e., if n ≈ .8n ), a simple calculation veriﬁes
that the consumers’ beliefs will ascribe probability close to 1 to state θ1 (i.e.,
(µ(θ1|n),µ(θ2|n)) ≈ (1,0)). If n is large and if approximately 80% of the widgets
are of type 2 (i.e., if n ≈ .2n ), the same calculation veriﬁes that the consumers’ be-
liefs will ascribe probability close to 1 to state θ2 (i.e., (µ(θ1|n),µ(θ2|n)) ≈ (0,1)).





2 ) ≈ (25,0) and if the true but unobserved state is θ2, then,




2 ) ≈ (0,10). When n
is large, the production decision of a single producer has only a small eﬀect on
the ratio n
n. If n is large, it follows that, with probability close to 1, any single
producer who changes production from one type of widget to the other will have
only a small eﬀect on consumers’ beliefs, and hence on the prices of the widgets.
Suppose that n is large and that producers are employimg the separating
strategy. Consider a producer who receives signal s1. He believes that the price of
5In addition, there will exist equilibria which are pooling, and hence, are not fully revealing.
This is discussed in the last section.
8at y p e1w i d g e tw i l lb ec l o s et o2 5w i t hp r o b a b i l i t yP(θ1|s1)=.8 and close to 0
with probability P(θ2|s1)=.2, yielding an expected price of 20 for type 1 widgets.
On the other hand, he believes that the price of a type 2 widget will be close to
0 with probability P(θ1|s1)=.8 and close to 10 with probability P(θ2|s1)=.2,
yielding an expected price of 2 for type 2 widgets. Consequently, a producer who
observes signal s1 will produce a type 1 widget.
A similar calculation will be made by a producer who receives signal s2. He
believes that the price of a type 1 widget will be close to 25 with probability
P(θ1|s2)=.2 and close to 0 with probability P(θ2|s1)=.8, yielding an expected
price of 5 for type 1 widgets. On the other hand, he believes that the price of
a type 2 widget will be close to 0 with probability P(θ1|s2)=.2 and close to 10
with probability P(θ2|s2)=.8, yielding an expected price of 8 for type 2 widgets.
Consequently, a producer who observes signal s2 will produce a type 2 widget..
In summary, there will exist a fully revealing market equilibrium when the
number of agents is suﬃciently large. It will be an equilibrium for each producer
to produce the widget that maximizes expected value given his own information
alone if other producers are doing the same. Any deviation from this will have
a vanishingly small eﬀect on price as the number of producers becomes large,
making such deviations unproﬁtable.
3. Modelling the Consumer
The concept, market equilibrium, models producers as strategic, specifying pre-
cisely what actions are available to them, but does not do the same for consumers.
In this section, we model the second stage game as a Shapley-Shubik market game
(Shubik (1973), Shapley (1974)), in which producers put goods and consumers put
money on widget-1 and widget-2 trading posts, with the prices determined to clear
the markets. We will consider limits, as the number of consumers approaches in-
ﬁnity, of symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria in which all producers oﬀer their
widgets for sale. These equilibria will deﬁne beliefs, producer strategies, and prices
that constitute a market equilibrium. We view this section as justifying the simpler
model of section 2.
Wherever possible, we maintain the notation of section 2. The timing of the
game is now as follows. At stage 1, producers observe their signal, either s1 or s2,
and decide which widget to produce. We restrict attention to equilibria in which
all producers adopt the same production strategy, σ, and supply their widget
9to the appropriate trading post. At stage 2, consumers observe the number of
widgets of each type that were produced, where n denotes the number of type 1
widgets and n−n is the number of type 2 widgets. After observing n,c o n s u m e r s
decide how much money to bid for type 1 widgets and type 2 widgets, at their
respective trading posts.
Let h be the number of consumers, and let j index a particular consumer. For
j =1 ,...,h, let b
j
1(n) denote the amount of money that consumer j bids on the
widget-1 trading post when the number of type-1 widgets produced is n,a n dl e t
b
j
2(n) denote the amount of money that consumer j bids on the widget-2 trading
post when the number of type-1 widgets produced is n. A strategy for consumer
j is a mapping, ψ
j : Jn → R2




2(n) ≤ 20 holds for all n.































1(n) denotes consumer j’s purchases of widget 1 when the number of
type-1 widgets produced is n, x
j
2(n) denotes consumer j’s purchases of widget 2
when the number of type-1 widgets produced is n,a n dmj(n) denotes consumer
j’s money consumption when the number of type-1 widgets produced is n.T h e
money received by a ﬁrm selling a particular widget is the price of that widget.



















The allocation rule guarantees that all trade on a market takes place at the
same price, which is the total amount of money bid divided by the total amount of
widgets supplied. From (3.1) and (3.2), we see that the percentage of the widgets
up for sale that consumer j purchases is equal to the percentage of the money that
consumer j bids. If numerator and denominator are both zero in (3.1) or (3.2),
then consumers do not receive any widgets. Therefore, we adopt the convention
10that 0
0 =0in (3.1) and (3.2). However, prices are a diﬀerent story. If, say, there
are no type-1 widgets produced and no money is bid for type-1 widgets, then the
price of type-1 widgets is indeterminate. The resolution of this indeterminacy is
irrelevant for the characterization of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, but could aﬀect
the comparison to market equilibrium. We will comment on this later.
We restrict attention to symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which all
widgets produced are supplied to the market. To ﬁnd an equilibrium, we ﬁnd
consumer j’s best response to the common strategy played by all other consumers,
(b1(n),b 2(n)),a f t e rn type-1 widgets are produced. We then impose the condition
that consumer j’s best response is in fact (b1(n),b 2(n)). Given beliefs, µ,t h e






















2(n)+( h − 1)b2(n)
.




2(n)) = (b1(n),b 2(n)),a n d
simplifying, we have
b1(n)=
µ(θ1 | n)25n(h − 1)
h2
b2(n)=
µ(θ2 | n)10(n − n)(h − 1)
h2 .
Notice that the above equilibrium bids are uniquely determined, as long as we












)10µ(θ2 | n). (3.4)
The prices in (3.3) and (3.4) are uniquely determined from the ratio of bids and
oﬀers, except for pn
1 when n =0holds, and pn
2 when n = n holds. In these cases,
bids and oﬀers are zero, but either n or (n−n) appear in both the numerator and
denominator, and cancel each other. Thus, we will deﬁne the prices associated
with a symmetric PBE by (3.3) and (3.4).6
6The prices given by (3.3) and (3.4), for the case of markets with zero supply and demand,
would arise if we placed ε oﬀers of widgets on each market, and let ε approach zero. See the
discussion of virtual prices in, say, Dubey and Shubik (1978).
11Proposition. Consider a sequence (σh,ψ
h,µ h)h where (σh,ψ
h,µ h) is a symmet-












is a market equilibrium for beliefs limh0→∞ µh0.
Proof. From the deﬁnition of PBE, and because there are only four possible
producer strategies, σh,t h e r ee x i s t sh,σ, and µ such that h0 > h implies:
(1) σh = σ,a n d
(2) µh(θ1 | n)=µ(θ1 | n) and µh(θ2 | n)=µ(θ2 | n) for all n occurring
with positive probability, given σ.T h u s , µ is consistent with σ, according to
the criterion required for a PBE. This also implies that µ is consistent with σ,
according to the criterion required for a market equilibrium.
>From (3.3) and (3.4), we see that, for h0 > h, the incentives for producers
to deviate are exactly the same in the PBE as they are in a market equilibrium.
Sequential rationality of σ in the PBE implies {σ} satisﬁes part (i) of the de-
ﬁnition of a market equilibrium, given beliefs µ. The limiting price function,




In the example, market equilibrium cannot be fully revealing when the number
of producers is small, but is fully revealing when the number of producers is
suﬃciently large. Because producers are informationally small in large economies,
they cannot gain by attempting to manipulate prices. However, even for large
economies, a fully revealing market equilibrium is not a rational expectations
equilibrium. In a rational expectations equilibrium, producers can observe the
prices of widget-1 and widget-2, infer the state of nature, and produce the widget
corresponding to the correct state. In the example, the market equilibrium is
fully revealing, but only after output has been produced. A producer will produce
the wrong widget with probability .2, so a market equilibrium is not ex post
eﬃcient. Also, if we were to change the parameter for observing the correct signal
from .8 to .6, then there is no fully revealing market equilibrium. Producers are
informationally small, so there is no incentive to manipulate market prices, but
12producers receiving signal s2 are better oﬀ gambling that their signal is wrong
and producing widget 1.
Markets are incomplete in the example: there is no forward market in which
producers can sell their planned output before producing it. As mentioned in the
introduction, the structure of markets is crucial for the example. Suppose instead
that the only market available operated in the ﬁrst period, in which producers
could oﬀer widgets of either type for delivery in the second period. Whatever
prices prevail in this forward market, all producers will wish to sell the same wid-
get — the widget with the higher price. Thus, it is impossible that producers with
diﬀerent signals will behave diﬀerently. But when all producers behave identically
regardless of their information, the price cannot reﬂect their information.7 On
the other hand, suppose that a securities market operated in the ﬁrst period, on
which producers could trade money, contingent on whether the number of wid-
gets produced was greater than, or less than, n
2. Now production could depend on
the prices of securities, so that full revelation would lead to eﬃcient production
decisions. In future work, we will explore the conjecture that, in this more com-
plete market structure, fully revealing market equilibria exist, and correspond to
rational expectations equilibria.
One might imagine a non-tatonement process that reveals producers’ informa-
tion (for example, a bargaining process between buyers and sellers), with trade
taking place only after revelation has taken place. Assuming such an unmodelled
process is unsatisfactory, however. The point of the present exercise is to under-
stand when agents’ private information will be revealed when those agents are
behaving strategically with respect to the revelation. Any interesting analysis
addressing this issue must model the process by which agents’ information is re-
ﬂected in prices. In other words, it is necessary to specify exactly what actions
agents can take and the mapping of their actions into prices and outcomes.8
Specifying that producers choose which widgets to produce, with prices and
outcomes arising from competitive behavior subsequent to the choices, provides a
precise and plausible mechanism by which informed agents’ information is incor-
porated into prices. One can, of course, think of alternative mechanisms that link
agents’ actions and resulting outcomes, but the intuition in the example is quite
general. Whatever the mechanism linking actions and prices, if strategic behav-
ior is modelled by Bayes equilibria, the revelation principle applies. An agent’s
7This is similar to the phenomenon in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
8See Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1987) for an early argument along these lines and the
general treatment of the question in Jackson and Peck (1999).
13incentive to misreport his information will be limited by the degree to which his
report aﬀects the expected price. Said diﬀerently, those agents whose information
is likely to have a trivial eﬀect on price have little to gain from misreporting that
information. For many natural mechanisms, when the gains from altering behav-
ior to aﬀect the price are small, equilibrium actions will be close to actions that
are optimal ignoring the eﬀect on price.
Multiple equilibria
We have demonstrated the existence of a fully revealing incentive compatible
ME when the number of producers was suﬃc i e n t l yl a r g e . T h i sd o e sn o tm e a n
that all incentive compatible ME’s are fully revealing. The nonrevealing ME in
which sellers produce widget 1 regardless of their signal, at a price of (12.5,10)
remains an incentive compatible ME. This will be a perfect Bayes equilibrium if
consumers’ beliefs following the disequilibrium choice of widget 2 by a producer
were that that producer had seen signal s1 with probability .5.E v e ni fc o n s u m e r s
beliefs were such that they believed that a producer who made this disequilibrium
choice had seen signal s2, this would have a negligible eﬀect on the subsequent
price when there are many producers. As a result, the return to a producer who
chose to produce widget 2 would be lower than producing widget 1.
Our point is not that a large number of agents necessarily leads to informa-
tion revelation but only that a large number (and the consequent informational
smallness) makes the return to manipulation of prices through the information
revealed vanish asymptotically.
Interim vs. ex post incentive compatibility
The revealing ME is incentive compatible because at the time the seller makes
his decision about which widget to produce, a change will have a small eﬀect on
the price with high probability. This is because the law of large numbers implies
that for “most” realizations of the sellers’ signals, the posterior on Θ given the
signals puts probability close to 1 o nt h et r u es t a t e ,a n da n ys i n g l ed e v i a t i o ni n
the sellers’ choice of widgets will have a small eﬀect on the posterior. For some
realizations, however, a single seller’s change in the widget produced can have a
nonnegligible eﬀect on the posterior. Suppose that there are 1001 sellers, and the
vector of signals s is such that 500 sellers receive s1 and 501 sellers receive s2.
P(θ1|s)=.4 in this case. Consider, however, the vector of signals s0 in which one
s2 is changed to an s1; P(θ1|s0)=.6. In other words, a single seller’s change in
14the choice of the widget to produce causes a nontrivial change in the posterior
distribution on Θ, given the change in inference resulting from the production
change. The nontrivial change, of course, translates into a nontrivial change in
the market price.
Regardless of the number of replicas, a single seller’s actions will have a non-
trivial eﬀect on market prices for some realizations of the other agents’ signals.
However, when the number of sellers is large, the probability that the other sell-
ers’ signals are such that any given seller will have a nontrivial eﬀect on the price
is small. Since the potential gains from any change in price are bounded, the
expected price change resulting from a change in production will be small when
there are many sellers.
The presence of many other sellers makes a given seller informationally small.
Given the other sellers’ information, the given seller’s signal provides little addi-
tional information, and the posterior distribution on Θ is not likely to be very
sensitive to his information, and hence not likely to be sensitive to his market
behavior.
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